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ABSTRACT: As a supplement to John L. Heilbron’s account, I will argue that, although the label ‘experimental physics’ can be rightfully 
used to describe aspects of Petrus van Musschenbroek’s (1692-1761) work, the latter’s understanding of ‘physica’ is to be situated 
within a broader framework in which theological, philosophical and teleological considerations continued to play an important role. 
First, I will draw attention to Musschenbroek’s views on the scope of physica and especially to his conception of a law of nature. It 
will be shown that by radicalizing certain aspects of Isaac Newton’s methodological ideas van Musschenbroek no longer considered 
physics as the discipline that uncovered causes from effects, as Newton did, but as the discipline that studies the effects of unknown 
causes. In addition, I will show that van Musschenbroek endorsed the view that the laws of nature are contingent on God’s free 
will and that they are knowable due to his goodness. Second, it will be argued that for van Musschenbroek physics, alongside with 
teleology, had clear physico-theological repercussions. Along the way, van Musschenbroek’s views on the principle of sufficient 
reason will be discussed for the first time.
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nature; Voluntarism; Principle of sufficient reason.
RESUMEN: Como complemento al relato de John L. Heilbron, argumentaré que aunque la etiqueta ‘física experimental’ se puede usar 
legítimamente para describir algunos aspectos de la obra de Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761), la comprensión de la ‘physica’ 
de este último se ha de entender dentro de un marco más amplio en el que las consideraciones teológicas, filosóficas, y teleológicas 
continuaron desempeñando una función importante. En primer lugar, me centraré en la concepción de van Musschenbroek en el 
ámbito de la ‘physica’ y en especial en su concepto de una ley de la naturaleza. Se verá que, al radicalizar algunos aspectos de las 
ideas metodológicas de Isaac Newton, van Musschenbroek ya no se considera la física como la disciplina que descubre las causas 
de efectos, como hizo Newton, sino como la disciplina que estudia los efectos de causas desconocidas. Además, se verá que van 
Musschenbroek pensaba que las leyes de la naturaleza están supeditadas a la libre voluntad de Dios y que son cognoscibles debido a 
la bondad de Dios. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que para van Musschenbroek la física, junto con la teleología, tenía claras repercu-
siones físico-teológicas. En el camino, por primera vez discutirá su posición en relación con el principio de razón suficiente.
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Petrus (Pieter) van Musschenbroek (1692-1761; see 
Fig. 1) was one of the most renowned eighteenth-centu-
ry Dutch experimental philosophers. Before returning to 
the University of Leiden in 1740, where he obtained his 
doctoral degree in medicine in 1715 with a dissertation 
on the presence of air in animal fluids (van Musschen-
broek, 1715), van Musschenbroek, who descended from 
a family of instrument makers, was previously appoint-
ed at the University of Duisburg (1719-1723) and at the 
University of Utrecht (1723-1739).2 Like his colleague 
Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688-1742), van Muss-
chenbroek spent some time in England: in 1717 he trav-
elled to London to attend J. T. Desaguliers’ (1683-1744) 
lectures on experimental philosophy —unfortunately, 
further details about his stay in England are lacking.
 The above woodcut was printed in van Musschen-
broek, 1739, which is based on Beginsels der natu-
urkunde (1739), i.e. the second edition of Beginselen 
der natuurkunde (1736), which was dedicated to the 
Amsterdam Mennonite and owner of the Utrecht-
based filature ‘Zijdebalen’ David van Mollem (1670-
1746) “as a sign of esteem and true friendship” (see 
Hamm, 2012, pp. 36-37 for further contextualization). 
Henrik Snakenburg’s (1674-1750) verses read: 
Whoever desires to know by what appearance van 
Musschenbroek blossomed, it was with such vivid 
strength. Whom Nature has admitted by her shrines 
and to whom she spontaneously unfolded her secret 
bosom like a friendly Goddess. Whom France cele-
brates and whom the English salute with praise. Here 
Holland rejoices having him as citizen.
Today, van Musschenbroek is remembered for a 
variety of reasons, mostly for strictly ‘scientific’ ones. 
He contributed to the study of magnetism as his Dis-
sertatio physica experimentalis de magnete (1729) 
testifies (van Musschenbroek, 1729, pp. 1-270), and 
he developed a famous pyrometer.3 Together with his 
collaborators Jean-Nicolas-Sébastien Allamand (1713-
1787) and Andreas Cunaeus (1712-1788), he also 
made —independently from Ewald Georg von Kleist 
(1700-1748)— one of the first capacitors, the famous 
‘Leyden jar’,4 which upon its discovery produced such 
a shock that in a letter on 20 January 1746 van Muss-
chenbroek wrote to René-Antoine Ferchault de Réau-
mur (1683-1757): 
I would like to tell you about a new but terrible ex-
periment, which I advise you never to try yourself, nor 
would I, who have experienced it and survived by the 
grace of God, do it again for all the kingdom of France 
(quoted from Heilbron, 1999, p. 313).5 
Van Musschenbroek is also known as an enthusias-
tic teacher, whose textbooks were highly influential 
across Europe.6 After ‘s Gravesande’s death in 1742, 
van Musschenbroek was in full charge of teaching ex-
perimental philosophy at his alma mater. In his eu-
logy, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794), stated that 
“while his [i.e. van Musschenbroek’s] books contained 
only cold truths, the enthusiasm which animated 
his lessons excited that of his listeners” (Condorcet 
O’Connor and Arago, 1847, vol. II, p. 127).7 Van Muss-
chenbroek’s most comprehensive textbook, the more 
than 1100 pages long and posthumously published In-
troductio ad philosophiam naturalem (van Musschen-
broek, 1762),8 which according to John L. Heilbron ex-
emplified eighteenth-century ‘experimental physics’ 
like no other textbook had before (Heilbron, 1980, pp. 
363-367; see, furthermore, Guijarro Mora, 2001), was 
the pinnacle of his lifelong scientific activities. Heil-
bron considers van Musschenbroek as a prototypi-
cal example of the eighteenth-century experimental 
physicist. “In multiplying measurements and experi-
ments he had no superior,” Heilbron underscores, “his 
Fig. 1. Engraving by Jacob Houbraken of Petrus van 
Musschenbroek which is based on a painting by Jan 
Maurits Quinckhard (1738).
Source: Leiden University Library, Digital Special Collections, BN 1007.
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books filled with tables and drawings initiated genera-
tions into the study of experimental physics […]” (Hei-
lbron, 1980, pp. 365/7, cf. p. 363).
Can we, however, simply equate what van Muss-
chenbroek labelled ‘physics’ —‘physica’ in Latin; ‘nat-
uurkunde’ in his own vernacular— with what Heilbron 
calls ‘experimental physics’? Although it is true that 
during the eighteenth century natural philosophy in 
general gradually lost its metaphysical, causal and 
theological underpinnings and became the more ex-
perimental, quantitative and instrumentalist discipline 
which we now call ‘physics’ (Heilbron, 1999, pp. 9-19, 
pp. 71-73; Home, 2003; Frängsmyr et al., 1990), van 
Musschenbroek is to be considered as a transitional 
figure in the shift from natural philosophy to physics 
for reasons that will become more clear in what fol-
lows. As a supplement to Heilbron’s account, I shall 
argue that, although the label ‘experimental phys-
ics’ can be rightfully used to describe aspects of van 
Musschenbroek’s work, the latter’s understanding of 
‘physica’ is to be situated within a broader framework 
in which theological, philosophical and teleological 
considerations continued to play an important role. I 
will argue for this claim in two steps. First, I will draw 
attention to van Musschenbroek’s views on the scope 
of physica and especially to his conception of a law 
of nature in the next section. It will be shown that 
by radicalizing certain aspects of Newton’s method-
ological ideas van Musschenbroek no longer consid-
ered physica as the discipline that uncovered causes 
from effects, as Newton did, but as the discipline that 
studies the effects of unknown causes. This aspect of 
his thinking seems to square well with Heilbron’s in-
strumentalist characterization of experimental phys-
ics. However, it will be pointed out that van Muss-
chenbroek thought that the laws of nature are —in 
a way unknown to us— contingent on God’s free will 
and that they are knowable due to God’s goodness. 
Second, it will be argued in the third section that for 
van Musschenbroek physics, alongside with teleology, 
had clear physico-theological repercussions. Along 
the way, for the first time van Musschenbroek’s views 
on the principle of sufficient reason will be brought to 
the fore. Throughout this essay I will approach these 
issues by a close reading of the entirety of van Muss-
chenbroek’s published and unpublished work. With 
respect to the latter it should be kept in mind that in 
most cases Musschenbroek’s manuscripts are undat-
ed, which makes it rather difficult for the interested 
scholar to set up an exact chronological account of the 
development of his thought.
 “HÆC ARCANA SUNT:” VAN MUSSCHENBROEK ON 
THE SCOPE OF PHYSICA
According to van Musschenbroek, the objects of 
physics are body (corpus),9 i.e. everything “we can see 
or feel, or whatever resists pressure,” space (spatium), 
i.e. “[t]he extension of the universe in which all bodies 
are placed and move every way,”10 and motion (mo-
tus), i.e. “the translation of body out of one part of 
space into another” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, 
pp. 3-4; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 3). Because we 
lack innate ideas of bodies and their qualities, every-
thing that pertains to them is learned either by obser-
vation, i.e. the perception of the qualities that bodies 
spontaneously offer to us, or by “experiments or trials 
[Experimenta, vel Pericula],” i.e. by active manipula-
tions of bodies for the purpose of discovering those 
properties of bodies that do not otherwise appear 
to our senses (van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, pp. 
4-5). If the senses stay within the limits by which they 
are circumscribed and if they are rightly disposed, 
they will never deceive us. Those who assert that the 
senses are deceptive oppose “the sanctity of the most 
perfect Entity, who is the fountain of all truths [sanc-
titati Entis perfectissimi, omnium veritatum fontis]” 
(van Musschenbroek, 1723, pp. 19-20). Experiments 
should be repeated, van Musschenbroek emphasized: 
“[i]f the repeated event should agree to the prior 
event, we are more certain that the test has been duly 
made and that no error has crept in” (van Musschen-
broek, 1756, xxiv). Phenomena or appearances are 
defined as “[a]ll the situations, motions, mutations, 
and actions of bodies, which we may observe by our 
senses, whether by one or more of them” (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 4; van Musschenbroek, 
1741, p. 3). This definition clearly resembles the way 
in which van Musschenbroek’s colleague ’s Graves-
ande characterized phenomena, namely as:
all Situations, and Motions, of natural Bodies, not 
immediately depending upon the Action of an intelli-
gent Being, and which may be observed by our Senses 
[omnes situs, & omnes motus, Corporum naturalium, 
ab actione Entis intelligentis immediate non pendentes, 
& qui à nobis sensibus observari possunt] (’s Graves-
ande, 1747, vol. I, p. 1; ’s Gravesande, 1742, vol. I, p. 1).
 Since all changes in bodies (“increase, decrease, 
generation, corruption, or other alteration whatever”) 
are produced by motion, motion is, according to van 
Musschenbroek, “the principal object of Physicks [pri-
marium Physicæ objectum est Motus]” (van Musschen-
broek, 1744, vol. I, p. 5; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 
4). The motions of bodies occur, “whatever may be 
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the cause of their motion [quæcunque causa movens 
existerit],” according to certain rules or laws of nature 
(“leges naturæ”), i.e. “those constant appearances or 
effects, which always occur in the same way, whenever 
bodies are in similar circumstances [constantes ap-
paritiones vel effectus, qui, quotiescunque corpora in 
similibus sunt occasionibus, semper eodem eveniunt 
modo]” —consequently, phenomena that occur con-
trary to the laws of nature are miraculous (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, pp. 5-6; van Musschenbroek, 
1741, p. 4-5). In other words, for van Musschenbroek 
the aim of physica is to establish not the efficient causes 
of effects, but the rules according to which those ef-
fects occur. Yet again, van Musschenbroek’s words re-
mind us of ’s Gravesande’s, who had written that a law 
of nature is “every simple Effect, which continues the 
same upon all Occasions, whose Cause is unknown to 
us, and which we find cannot flow from any Law known 
to us, tho’ perhaps it may from a more simple Law, un-
known to us [omnis effectus simplex, qui in omnibus 
occasionibus idem est, cujus causa nobis est ignota, & 
quem videmus ex nullâ Lege, nobis notâ fluere posse, 
quamvis fortè ex simpliciori Lege, nobis ignotâ, fluat]” 
(’s Gravesande, 1747, vol. I, pp. 2-3; ’s Gravesande, 
1742, vol. I, p. 2). Therefore, as van Musschenbroek 
continued, “by knowing and observing these laws, we 
can often know and foresee what will be their effects.” 
For “if we observed yesterday, that a wedge, being im-
pelled with a certain force, clove a piece of wood; we 
may certainly conclude, that a wedge being impelled 
to day with the same force will have the same effect” 
(van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 5; van Musschen-
broek, 1741, p. 4).11 Van Musschenbroek believed that 
the constancy of the laws of nature is ultimately guar-
anteed by the constancy of God’s will:
The laws are discoverable only by the use of the 
senses; for the wisest of mortals could not have dis-
covered any of them by reason and meditation, nor 
can pretend to have any innate ideas of them in his 
mind. For they all result from the arbitrary appoint-
ment of the Creator [a liberrimâ Creatoris voluntate], 
by which he has ordered, that the same constant mo-
tion shall always obtain on the same occasions. […] All 
these things might have been otherwise constituted 
[by God’s infinite power],12 if God had so pleased 
[voluisset]. And why he thought fit to constitute them 
in this manner, we can by no means apprehend. It is 
sufficient for us to know, that they are thus constitut-
ed, and to adore the infinite wisdom of the Creator, 
in this most admirable order and constitution of the 
universe. Therefore the cause and reason [causa & 
ratio] of these laws are entirely unknown to us, but 
we know they will perpetually be observed, because 
the divine will acts always in the most constant and 
uniform manner [quia voluntas divina constantissima 
est]. (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, pp. 5-6 [italics 
added]; van Musschenbroek, 1741, pp. 4-5)
“The laws [of nature] are all truly most constant,” 
he elaborated, “because divine will and providence 
are most constant and perfect, since God is always the 
same absolutely perfect, wise and immutable being” 
(van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, p. 8). Without the 
constancy of God’s operations the human race would 
be in a miserable state for want of certain knowledge 
(van Musschenbroek, 1736, p. 7). The goodness of God 
is clear “because nothing which is created is absolutely 
necessary [quia nihil quod creatum est, absolute ne-
cessarium est]” and because “he conserves us and the 
things he created at the time according to most simple, 
immutable and good laws [quia nos conservat, tum & 
creata, secundum leges simplicissimas, immutabiles, 
optimas]” (van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, p. 5). Like 
’s Gravesande (Ducheyne, 2014a, pp. 43-44), van Muss-
chenbroek believed that God’s goodness ultimately 
provides the secure foundation of our knowledge of 
the world. According to van Musschenbroek, only God 
is an “absolutely necessary being [Ens absolute necce-
sarium]” (LUL, BPL 240.7, f. 11v).13 The anti-Spinozist im-
pact of this statement should not be underestimated. 
As I have documented elsewhere (Ducheyne, 2014c), 
since at least the mid-1720s van Musschenbroek took 
serious issue with Spinoza’s philosophical system, in 
particular with his metaphysical necessitarianism ac-
cording to which “[t]hings could have been produced 
by God in no other way, and in no other order than they 
have been produced” (Curley, 1985, p. 436).14
Van Musschenbroek emphasized that we are igno-
rant as to whether the laws of nature immediately 
flow from God or whether they are produced by in-
termediate causes:
And thus from our perspective the laws [of nature] 
are simple effects which are the same in all similar 
circumstances and which we will not see to follow 
from any other law, the cause so to speak, even if they 
happened to flow from another more simple or gen-
eral law. For our [law] does not proclaim whether it 
immediately depends on the will of God, or whether 
is it caused by an unknown proximate cause which 
mediates and antecedes or by a long series of other 
causes. (van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, p. 7) 
The word ‘tanquam’ (‘so to speak’; ‘as if’) is cru-
cial here, for is indicates that van Musschenbroek, in 
line with his definition of a law of nature as “every 
simple Effect, which continues the same upon all Oc-
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casions, whose Cause is unknown to us,” did not con-
sider laws as real efficient causes. In identical vein, 
’s Gravesande claimed that “it matters not, whether 
any thing depends immediately upon the Will of God, 
or is produc’d by an intermediate Cause, of which we 
have no Idea [non interest, utrùm quid immediatè à 
Dei voluntate pendeat, an verò mediante causâ, cu-
jus nullam ideam habemus, producatur]” (’s Graves-
ande, 1747, vol. I, p. 2; ’s Gravesande, 1742, vol. I, 
pp. 2-3). Van Musschenbroek urged that, since only 
a few laws of nature have been discovered, we ought 
“to search them out diligently [sollicite]” (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 6; van Musschenbroek, 
1741, p. 5). However, “because nature abounds with 
such variety,” he observed, “we ought not to establish 
general rules from a few trials [ne extemplo ex pau-
corum examine generales Leges stabiliamus], which 
can only afford us particular conclusions;” rather, we 
ought to proceed slowly (van Musschenbroek, 1744, 
vol. I, pp. 6-7; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 6; cf. van 
Musschenbroek, 1736, p. 8). “Nature,” as van Muss-
chenbroek remarked amongst his notes in his own 
copy of Beginsels der natuurkunde (1739), is not “as 
parsimonious as some Philosophers have imagined 
[niet zo spaarzaam […] als Sommige Wijsgeeren zich 
verbeelden]” (LUL, BPL 240.61, p. 10).15 
Like ’s Gravesande (Ducheyne, 2014a, pp. 35-36), 
van Musschenbroek clearly rejected the idea that we 
can know the essences of bodies:
Now that many of the attributes of body may be 
still unknown, is evident from thence, because we can 
observe only by the help of our senses, how it is with 
the superficies of bodies. We only see the surface with 
our eyes, touch it with our hands, taste nothing but this 
with our tongue, nor smell any thing else with our nos-
trils. But what is that which is included within [hæret] 
the superficies of body? Is not this the thing that prop-
erly makes the body, and is it’s substance? But this we 
know nothing of. So that we know nothing but the shell 
of body [corticem corporis], and a few things that we 
collect besides from the phænomena, but not that 
which constitutes the intimate nature of the body [non 
autem id, quod corpus constituit, cognoscimus][.] (van 
Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, pp. 12-13, cf. p. 25; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, pp. 22-23, cf. p. 36)16
According to van Musschenbroek, humans can only 
acquire knowledge of the essences and essential attri-
butes of mathematical objects, but they cannot know 
the nature “of God, of all things created, whether spiri-
tual or corporeal, or of space, although in all of these 
things there is a certain nature [nec Dei, nec ullarum 
rerum creatarum, sive spiritualem, sive corporearum, 
sive spatii naturam cognoscimus: nihilominus omni-
bus his rebus natura quaedam inest]” (van Musschen-
broek, 1748b, p. 7).17 Correspondingly, the attributes 
and qualities of bodies and the laws of nature cannot 
be known a priori by metaphysical speculation (van 
Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 14, p. 26, p. 35; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 12, p. 23, p. 32). We “can-
not inspect into the internal substance of bodies [in 
Substantiam corporum internam introspicere nobis 
non licet]; nor do we understand how heavy bodies, 
that are remote from one another, can operate upon 
each other [in se mutuo operabuntur], when nothing 
intervenes between them,” for “[w]e see or under-
stand nothing, but the constant effects of this [attract-
ing] force [nihil præter effectus quotidianos videmus, 
aut intelligimus]” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 
200; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 185). In view of this, 
the cause of gravity is unknown and all proposals on 
the matter are mere hypotheses (van Musschenbroek, 
1744, vol. I, p. 106, p. 199; van Musschenbroek, 1741, 
p. 99, p. 184). The word ‘attraction’ in other words 
does not refer to “a mode of action,” but rather to 
the effect or the phenomenon (van Musschenbroek, 
1744, vol. I, p. 197; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 182). 
Although, “it is very evident, that bodies cannot ap-
proach one another, but there must be some active 
principle [Principium aliquod activum], that is able to 
produce such a motion,” we are “at a loss about those 
principles” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 198, p. 
200; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 183, p. 185):18
If we consider the phenomena which the bodies 
themselves present us with, we shall be easily in-
duced to admit such active principles, as are the cause 
of gravitation and attraction. By virtue of these prin-
ciples bodies tend to one another, rush upon one an-
other, and those that touch cohere no otherwise than 
as if they were pressed to one another by some exter-
nal force. […] But we cannot produce these principles 
to view, nor tell how many or what they are, because 
our senses are not acute enough to penetrate into 
the inward substance of bodies, but there are many 
things whose existence must be allowed, though we 
may be entirely ignorant of their nature [multa sunt, 
quae esse concedimus, qualia sint, ignoramus.]. (van 
Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 198, pp. 199-200; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, pp. 184-185) 
Van Musschenbroek seized Newton’s admission 
that the cause of gravity is unknown as an opportu-
nity to point, more generally, to our ignorance of the 
operations of nature in general:19
Perhaps the manner, in which the attractive force 
operates, will never be known; and such a degree of 
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knowledge is never to be attained by the ablest Phi-
losophers; for indeed we do not understand the man-
ner of operating of any one thing; and all we can do 
is to observe effects that constantly flow from thence. 
[…] All these mysteries are concealed from us mortals 
[Omnia hæc mortales latent]. Those that think they 
very well understand the impulse of bodies, because 
manifest effects of it continually present themselves 
before their eyes, seem not at all to consider what 
produces those effects, nor to distinguish between 
cause and effect. Nor is it better understood, how 
the human body acts upon an incorporeal mind, or 
how the mind acts upon the body; or how a spirit can 
act upon a spirit. These things will always be secrets 
to us, into which we are not permitted to penetrate 
[hæc arcana sunt, in quæ penetrare nobis concessum 
non est]. Let us therefore leave these fruitless enqui-
ries, and apply ourselves carefully to observe effects, 
and to make proper experiments, that we may have 
sure and firm foundations to reason upon; and that 
quitting all prejudice and prepossession, and avoid-
ing party decisions, as also the itch of disputing, we 
may pursue truth only, promote science, and so direct 
our united studies and endeavours, that they may 
terminate in the general benefit of mankind. (van 
Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, viii-x [italics added]; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, *5b-*6b)
Together with ’s Gravesande, van Musschenbroek 
contributed to an important transformation within 
eighteenth-century natural philosophy: whereas 
for Isaac Newton “the main Business of natural Phi-
losophy is to argue from Phaenomena without feign-
ing Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects” 
(Newton, 1952, p. 369 [italics added]),20 for van Muss-
chenbroek (and for ’s Gravesande) it became the study 
of the effects (of unknown causes) (Ruestow, 1973, p. 
127, p. 138). Moreover, whereas Newton considered 
the search for the cause of gravity as a worthwhile 
enterprise (Newton, 1952, cxxiii), van Musschenbroek 
(and ’s Gravesande) simply rejected it outright as a fu-
tile endeavour. Van Musschenbroek also changed the 
goal of physics from the search for efficient causes to 
the search for universal regularities and in doing so 
he gradually turned it into physics. However, for van 
Musschenbroek physica was, as we will now see in the 
next section, still part of a broader disciplinary whole: 
philosophy. Furthermore, he endorsed the view that it 
is possible to know the final causes of things by study-
ing the results obtained in physics. 
“MIRACULA DIVINA IN CLARISSIMA LUCE PONIT”: 
PHYSICA’S PLACE WITHIN PHILOSOPHIA
According to van Musschenbroek, ‘physica’ is a 
part of philosophy.21 Philosophy, as he explained, is 
“the knowledge [Scientia] of all things both divine 
[i.e. “God himself, and all the works he has produced 
out of himself, whether they are spiritual, or whether 
they are corporeal and extended”] and human [i.e. “all 
the actions of men, and all artificial things contrived 
by them, by disposing the things they find created 
to their hands, in a new manner and situation”], and 
of their properties, operations, causes, and effects; 
which may be known by the understanding, the sens-
es, reason, or by any other way whatever [Intellectu, 
Sensibus, Ratione, vel aliâ quacunque viâ]” (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 1 [italics added]; van Muss-
chenbroek, 1741, p. 1). The best preparation for phi-
losophy is “a previous acquaintance with the Liberal 
Arts, and especially […] Mathematics” (van Musschen-
broek, 1744, vol. I, p. 3; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 
3). The end of philosophy is “to promote the real hap-
piness of mankind, as far as may be attained in this 
life” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 1; van Muss-
chenbroek, 1741, p. 1). Knowledge of spiritual things, 
on the one hand, and knowledge of corporeal things, 
on the other, is acquired differently: whereas spiritual 
beings can only be known “by reason and the under-
standing [Intellectu & Ratione],” everything which is 
corporeal can only be known by means of the senses 
[Sensuum ope] (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 
2; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 1).22 According to 
van Musschenbroek, philosophy consists of six “parts 
[partes]:” to wit, pneumatica, metaphysica, practica, 
logica, physica, and teleologia (van Musschenbroek, 
1744, vol. I, pp. 2-3; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2).23 
In what follows, I will discuss each of these parts, while 
devoting most attention to physica and teleologia.
Pneumatica comprehends “whatever belongs to 
spiritual existences, their attributes and operations 
[Spirituum Existentia, Attributis, & Operationibus]” 
(van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 2; van Musschen-
broek, 1741, p. 2). Van Musschenbroek defined a spir-
it simply as an incorporeal thing (“Rem incorpoream”) 
in the annotations of one of his copies of Institutiones 
physicæ (1748) (LUL, BPL 240.56, f. 14v). Correspond-
ingly, pneumatica addresses God, who is an infinite 
and substantially omnipresent spirit24 and whom van 
Musschenbroek called “[e]ns summum, quod totus 
Spiritus est” (Musschenbroek, 1729, p. 2; cf. LUL, BPL 
240.7, f. 11r), and finite spirits, namely: angels, and 
human and animal souls (van Musschenbroek, 1736, 
p. 2; van Musschenbroek, 1762, p. 1). Metaphysica 
“explains [exponit] such general things as are in com-
mon to all created beings,” such as “being, substance, 
mode, relation, possible, impossible, necessary, 
contingent, &c.” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, 
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pp. 2-3; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2). Metaphys-
ics contains both ontology, the study of the general 
characteristics of being, and cosmology, which treats 
of “the general characteristics of the universe” (van 
Musschenbroek, 1748a, p. 2; van Musschenbroek, 
1762, vol. I, p. 3). In Beginselen der natuurkunde van 
Musschenbroek stated that, although metaphysics is 
useful, its usefulness is “less than is usually suggested 
[minder, als men plagt op te geeven]” (van Musschen-
broek, 1736, p. 4). He also emphasized that those, 
“who attempt to explain natural Philosophy from 
Metaphysicks [qui ex Metaphysica Physicam expli-
care aggrediuntur],” always run into error (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 35; van Musschenbroek, 
1741, p. 32).25 Practica gives us “the rules, by which 
we should direct all our actions, in order to discharge 
those duties [officia] we owe to God, to ourselves, and 
to other men” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 
3; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2). Logica “consid-
ers [explicat] the intelligent and reasoning faculty of 
the human mind, and instructs us in the methods of 
reasoning justly [methodum dirigendi ingenii], and of 
avoiding error, and directs the understanding in it’s 
search after hidden truths, and teaches to demon-
strate them when found” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, 
vol. I, p. 3; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2).26
Physica examines “the space of the whole universe 
[Spatium totius Universi], and all bodies contained in 
it” and “enquires [indagans] into their nature, attri-
butes, properties, actions, passions, situation, order, 
powers, causes, effects, modes, magnitudes, origins; 
proving these mathematically as far as may be done 
[ea Mathematice, quantum fieri potest, probans]” 
(van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 2; van Musschen-
broek, 1741, p. 1). Beginselen der natuurkunde con-
tained the following variant:
The second [i.e. the second part of philosophy] 
is physics, in which all created bodies, heavenly 
and earthly, are examined. This part deals with the 
properties that are common to all bodies, with their 
forces when they are moved, with their effects on 
other bodies, with all causes, which generate forces 
in them, and with the order according to which the 
major bodies are placed in the universe. This part, 
furthermore, deals with all bodies in particular, as 
it describes their figure, magnitude, gravity, and the 
other properties, which particular bodies possess. 
(van Musschenbroek, 1736, pp. 2-3)
In his annotations of his own copy of Beginsels der 
natuurkunde, van Musschenbroek stated that his de-
sire to search for the causes of phenomena was “the 
only old yeast of the Cartesian philosophy [eenige oude 
zuurdeessem van de Cartesiaansche Philosophie]” still 
remaining in him” (LUL, BPL 240.61, interleaved fo-
lio between ***2-***3). However, as we have seen, 
whenever van Musschenbroek dealt with ‘causes’ 
within the domain of physica, he systematically re-
ferred to the regularities or laws of nature according to 
which effects always occur in the same way in similar 
circumstances and not to their efficient causes.27 Ac-
cording to van Musschenbroek, the usefulness of phys-
ics (“Utilitas Physicæ”) is of no small importance:
As first for the understanding, explaining, and pro-
moting all human arts and sciences, and chiefly the art 
of medicine. Secondly, it purges our minds from a vain 
and useless admiration of appearances, it removes 
the terror of death, we shall not be disturbed with 
those dreadful fears which commonly attend the igno-
rance of the nature of things, and we shall be relieved 
from superstition. Also this science places the divine 
wonders in the clearest light [hæc scientia, miracula 
Divina in clarissima luce ponit]. And thirdly it leads us 
directly to know and prove the existence of God and 
his providence, and to a right understanding of many 
of his attributes as his power wisdom, goodness, &c. 
[nos ducit ad existentiam Dei, ejusque providentiam 
cognoscendam, probandam; tum ad ejus attributa 
plurima, præcipue potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem 
&c. optime intelligenda]. (van Musschenbroek, 1744, 
vol. I, p. 9; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 8)
In relation to physics, knowledge (“cognitio”) is 
threefold: historical knowledge refers to the knowl-
edge which we acquire by observing bodies and ap-
pearances —such knowledge is, as van Musschen-
broek observed, “primary, simple, certain and the 
basis of physics [basis Physicæ],” philosophical knowl-
edge refers to the knowledge we establish by discov-
ering and demonstrating the causes of appearances, 
and, mathematical knowledge refers to the knowledge 
we obtain when “the magnitudes of the appearances 
and their causes are considered geometrically and 
what follows from them is deduced [apparitionum, & 
causarum magnitudines Geometrice considerantur, & 
quæ ex iis fluunt, colliguntur]” (van Musschenbroek, 
1762, I, p. 11). This threefold distinction is inspired by 
the first chapter of Christian Wolff’s (1679-1754) Phi-
losophia rationalis, i.e. De triplici cognitione humana, 
historica, philosophica & mathematica (Wolff, 1736, 
pp. 1-13, esp. p. 3, p. 4, p. 7).28
Teleologia, which was banish from philosophy by 
“Descartes and his disciples [Cartesius cum suis Secta-
toribus]” (LUL, BPL 240.56, f. 18v, cf. ibid., BPL 240.54, 
interleaved folio facing p. 2),29 investigates “the ends 
[fines], for the sake of which all things in the universe 
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have their existence, and all their actions, changes, 
and motions are performed; at least as far as human 
sagacity can penetrate [quantum humana sagacitate 
indagari possint]” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, 
p. 2; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2). Teleology has 
been mistakenly banned from the sciences. The illus-
trious men Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and especially 
Wolff, whose view that metaphysics is to precede 
physics and to provide it with appropriate principles 
he forcefully rejected (Wolff, 1736, p. 43),30 have 
rightly reintroduced it (van Musschenbroek, 1736, p. 
3). Wolff actually coined the term ‘teleologia’ in 1728 
(Wolff, 1728, p. 38). Like Newton, who in the General 
Scholium (1713) declared that “[w]e know him [i.e. 
God] only by his properties and attributes and by 
the wisest and best construction of things and their 
final causes” (Newton, 1999, p. 942 [italics added])31 
—but unlike ’s Gravesande (Ducheyne, 2014a, pp. 
40-41), van Musschenbroek was convinced that the 
final causes of things are humanly knowable to some 
extent. However, teleology “can never be carried to 
perfection [nunquam perfici poterit], because it is 
out of reach of men to find out all the ends which the 
Creator has proposed to himself [quia fines, quos sibi 
Deus32 proposuit, cunctos eruere hominibus conces-
sum non est]. And when we think we have found any 
of them, it can hardly be demonstrated in mathemati-
cal rigour” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 2 [ital-
ics added]; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 2). Although 
van Musschenbroek differentiated teleology from 
physics from a disciplinary perspective, both contrib-
ute closely to the same goal: to wit, to set forth “the 
infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of the omnipo-
tent Creator […] in all his works” (van Musschenbroek, 
1744, vol. I, x). Van Musschenbroek characterized te-
leology’s utility, as follows:
This part [of philosophy] is not without utility, for it 
augments our knowledge and shows the wisdom and 
goodness of God in the clearest light. The ends [of 
things] can be demonstrated more clearly at any time 
than the causes of many effects. It is most certain that 
nothing is done by God or made by human beings unless 
because of certain ends […]. Teleology, as far as it is use-
ful and cultivated by the celebrated [Christian] Wolff,33 
who has in this [part of philosophy] surpassed all those 
who were previously born, can, however, never be per-
fected. (van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, p. 2)34
In Institutiones physicæ and Introductio ad philoso-
phiam naturalem, he introduced some additional ar-
guments in support of the claim that teleology can 
never be perfected.35 Why God has created the animal 
and plant kingdom and the solar system in the way 
that he did depends “on God’s good pleasure and per-
fect wisdom, by which he understands all things and 
their connections, since he is the creator and ruler of 
all things, but mortal beings will always be ignorant 
of them,” he explained (van Musschenbroek, 1762, 
vol. I, p. 3). He also warned that it is not allowed “to 
extend demonstrations [concerning final causes] to 
similar things —except insofar as they are confirmed 
by new observations, because we see the manifest 
ends of some things, which do not have a place in 
similar things” (van Musschenbroek, 1762, vol. I, p. 
3). Despite these critical observations, van Musschen-
broek maintained that we are not entirely ignorant of 
teleology. Near the end of Elementa physicæ he would 
claim, for instance, that God created winds so that we 
may profit from sailing to distant parts of the world:
God has given us winds, that we may know things 
that are at a distance from us. For man would be an 
ignorant animal [inperitum Animal], and without 
much experience, if he were to be circumscribed by 
the limits of his native soil. Therefore God gave us 
winds, that by the navigation of ships we might be 
supplied with all the conveniences of life, and that 
we might enjoy many transmarine things we should 
stand in need of. That all mankind might have the 
benefit of such things as are produced in distant re-
gions, that there might be intercourse among remote 
nations, and that thus the power, wisdom, and munifi-
cence of our liberal Creator might be more generally 
known and acknowledged [ita liberalissimi Condito-
ris potentia, sapientia, & munificentia innotesceret]. 
(van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. II, pp. 327-328 [italics 
added]; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 599)
In Beginselen der natuurkunde he asserted, more-
over, that rain occurs so that the air may be cleansed 
from its impurities, so that plants may grow and so 
that there may be wells and rivers on earth (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1736, p. 2).36
When discussing teleology in his unpublished work, 
van Musschenbroek paid attention to the principle of 
sufficient reason,37 which he ultimately rejected. In 
his annotated copy of Institutiones physicae (1748) 
he formulated the principle of sufficient reason as 
follows: “It is certain that nothing can be done by an 
intelligent Being except for certain ends. This is the 
principle of sufficient reason introduced by Leibniz 
[Certum est nihil fieri ab Ente rationali nisi propter 
certos fines: Est hoc principium rationis sufficientis â 
Leibnitsio introductum]” (LUL, BPL 240.55, verso side 
of the second interleaved folio between pp. 16-17, cf. 
LUL, BPL 240.25, f. 92r) (see Fig. 2). There van Muss-
chenbroek pointed out that the principle assumes 
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that humans are able to fathom all of God’s inten-
tions. According to Gottfried W. Leibniz (1646-1716), 
whom van Musschenbroek characterized as someone 
who “cultivated metaphysics [metaphysicam … ex-
coluit],” but “by indulging excessively in hypotheses 
and insufficiently cultivating experimental philosophy, 
stood out insufficiently in physics” (LUL, BPL 240.9, 
104r-v), the principle of sufficient reason states that 
“nothing happens without a Reason why it should be 
so, rather than otherwise” (Clarke, 1717, p. 21).38 Van 
Musschenbroek labelled Leibniz’s Essais de Théodicée 
(1710) “a romantic fable [fabulam Romanensem]” 
(LUL, BPL 240.24, f. 5r) and he forcefully rejected his 
idea of harmonia praestabilitas (LUL, BPL 240.24, ff. 
349r-366v, ff. 394r-404v). He also rejected the necessi-
tarianism implied in Leibniz’ (and Wolff’s)39 version of 
the principle of sufficient reason —and especially its 
corollary that God could not have created the world 
differently from how it is (LUL, BPL 240.24, ff. 65r-75v, 
esp. f. 65v and f. 71r).40 Rational beings, such as God, 
are not determined by absolute necessity, but only by 
moral necessity (LUL, BPL 240.12, f. 51r).
Fig. 2. Van Musschenbroek’s version of the principle 
of sufficient reason (BPL 240.55, verso side of the sec-
ond interleaved folio between pp. 16-17).
Van Musschenbroek’s manuscripts contain a sec-
ond locus in which he addressed the principle of suf-
ficient reason, namely in a neatly written philosophical 
dictionary in which he defined key-terms in physics, 
medicine, chemistry, and philosophy. Although it is un-
dated, this dictionary contains dated references —the 
latest one of which was published in 1756. This sug-
gests, considering the fact that the dictionary contains 
virtually no deletions or additions, that the version as 
we have it might have been composed thereabouts. 
In the lemma on the principle of sufficient reason, van 
Musschenbroek states that it “was refuted by Bosco-
vich in this treatise on the law of contiguity, p. 56, § 
126 [[r]efutatur a Boscovich in Tractate de Lege con-
tinuitatis pag 56. §126.]” (LUL, BPL 240.47, f. 75v) (see 
Fig. 3).41 The most significant objection against the 
principle of sufficient reason that the lemma contains 
goes as follows: “Because liberty is taken away from 
God and the absolute necessity of all things that exist 
and the (absolute) impossibility of those things that do 
not exist is introduced [Quia in Deo adimitur libertas, 
et introducitur absoluta necessitas singularum rerum, 
quæ existunt, et impossibilitas earum, quæ non exis-
tunt].” Van Musschenbroek concluded the lemma with 
the following words: “God is such a being for which 
(his) will stands before reason [Deus est tale Ens, cui 
stat pro ratione voluntas.]” (LUL, BPL 240.47, f. 75v).
Fig. 3. The lemma on the principle of sufficient rea-
son in van Musschenbroek’s philosophical dictionary 
(source: LUL, BPL 240.47, f. 75v).
Although, because of man’s limited knowledge 
of God’s providential plan, teleology can never be 
brought to perfection, it is a useful branch of philoso-
phy: it augments our knowledge, as van Musschen-
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broek argued. However, at the same time he empha-
sized that the utility of teleology is not restricted to 
a mere accumulation of knowledge: by unravelling 
small portions of God’s teleological plan, man ac-
complishes his religious duty to explore to what ends 
God has created the universe. From the consecutive 
changes and additions which he introduced in his 
textbooks, it is clear that van Musschenbroek became 
more and more concerned over time with conveying 
this message more clearly.42
CONCLUSION
Van Musschenbroek was a key figure in an impor-
tant scientific transformation, namely the transi-
tion from natural philosophy to physics. This tran-
sition did obviously not occur overnight. Instead, it 
was a complex and gradual process that continued 
throughout the nineteenth century. If we look at 
the state of physica in the mid-eighteenth century, 
Jed Z. Buchwald and Sungook Hong observe, “only 
a small portion of natural philosophy was quantita-
tive or tied to exacting experiment.” During the nine-
teenth century, physics was “transformed into a pro-
fessional, unified, quantitative, and exact discipline 
with methods that markedly distinguished it from 
astronomy, chemistry, and mathematics” (Buchwald 
and Hong, 2003, pp. 164-165; also see pp. 166-169 
for further discussion). Correspondingly, there were 
generations of scholars who worked in a hybrid field 
which was no longer strictly identifiable as philoso-
phia naturalis as it was practiced during the seven-
teenth century but not quite recognizable as physics 
as we know it today.
As has been shown elsewhere (de Pater, 2012 and 
Ducheyne, 2015), van Musschenbroek’s quantitative 
and experimental programme consisted in the col-
lecting of large quantified sets of experimental or 
observational data and in the establishment of ba-
sic mathematical proportions between two or more 
units of measurement. Here I have shown that not-
withstanding these modern features in his work theo-
logical, philosophical and teleological considerations 
continued to play an important role. Although van 
Musschenbroek contributed to the transformation 
of natural philosophy to physics by restricting the 
scope of physics to the study of universal regularities 
by a quantified and experimental approach, theo-
logical, philosophical and teleological issues were still 
deemed important and closely connected to physica. 
More precisely, we have seen that for him the laws 
of motion are contingent on the arbitrary will of God 
whose goodness ultimately provides the foundation 
of the reliability of our scientific knowledge and that 
in his view physica (and teleology) could contribute 
significantly to the worship of a divine being. Further-
more, I have brought to the fore van Musschenbroek’s 
anti-necessitarian and voluntarist criticism of the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason.
Van Musschenbroek made contributions to science 
which should be (and have been) studied in their own 
right. However, it should be kept in mind that his con-
tributions in these areas are only one aspect of his in-
tellectual legacy. In this essay, I have tried to show that 
studying the theological, philosophical and teleologi-
cal underpinnings of his work provide interesting re-
sults that contribute to a better understanding of what 
physica meant to a key eighteenth-century researcher.
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1. In the absence of standard translations of van Musschen-
broek’s work in Latin, I will rely on eighteenth-century 
English translations whenever available. For important 
passages, I will however provide the original Latin text be-
tween square brackets. If no translation is available, I will 
provide my own translations.
2. On the van Musschenbroek family and Petrus van Muss-
chenbroek’s older brother Jan, the instrument maker, 
see de Clercq, 1997a, chapters 2 and 3. For van Muss-
chenbroek’s biographical details I have relied on Struik, 
1974, de Pater (1979), pp. 24-28, Molhuysen, 1910-1924, 
and BML, a 251.
3. On van Musschenbroek’s pyrometer, see de Pater, 1979, 
pp. 33-40 and de Clercq, 1997b, p. 135 [item n° 213].
4. On the Leyden jar, see de Clercq, 1997a, pp. 41-44, Heil-
bron, 1999, pp. 312-323, Heilbron, 1966, and, for an illus-
tration, de Clercq, 1997b, p. 149 [item n° 240].
5. The original is to be found in Nollet, 1746, p. 2078.
6. There were translations of van Musschenbroek’s work in 
different languages (including French, English, German, 
Italian and Swedish) (de Pater, 1979, p. 30).
7. It is relevant here to point out that van Musschenbroek’s 
manuscripts (ca. 12,000 folios), which are preserved at the 
Special Collections Department of the Leiden University 
Library, contain a significant amount of course texts.
8. In 1726 van Musschenbroek composed his first textbook 
entitled Epitome elementorum physico-mathematicorum 
which is to be considered as the precursor of Elementa 
physicæ (17341; 17412). In 1736 he published a rendition of 
the first edition of Elementa physicæ in his own vernacular: 
Beginselen der natuurkunde —its second edition appeared 
three years later under the title Beginsels der natuurkunde. 
In 1748 another update of van Musschenbroek’s work ap-
peared under the title Institutiones physicæ.
9. Van Musschenbroek endorsed “the doctrine of atoms” 
(“Atomorum doctrina”) according to which atoms are 
“as it were the original particles, which God created at 
the beginning, and from whence all other bodies are de-
rived [profluxerunt]” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 
21; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 19). This doctrine, van 
Musschenbroek recorded, is “very ancient, and has been 
cultivated by Moschus, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, 
Lucretius, Gassendus, Newton, Boerhaave, Desaguliers 
and others” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, p. 21; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 19). Atoms are “without pores, 
perfectly solid, hard, firm, impenetrable, passive, move-
able” (van Musschenbroek, 1744, vol. I, pp. 21-22; van 
Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 19). Van Musschenbroek how-
ever pleaded ignorance on the ultimate reason for the 
composition of matter: “For the magnitude and figure of 
the last and least particles depends only on the will of God 
[a sola voluntate Dei], who has thought fit to create them 
thus and not otherwise. Therefore no further reason is to 
be inquired after [adeoque ulterius hic inquirenda non 
est ratio], why these things are so. The last particles must 
have some magnitude and figure, and God gave them 
such as seemed best to his wisdom.” (van Musschenbroek, 
1744, vol. I, p. 26; van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 23). God 
has not revealed the reasons why things are the way they 
are (van Musschenbroek, 1748a, p. 18; cf. van Musschen-
broek, 1762, vol. I, p. 29).
10. Van Musschenbroek endorsed Newton’s distinction be-
tween absolute and relative space and time (van Muss-
chenbroek, 1744, vol. I, pp. 57-58; van Musschenbroek, 
1741, pp. 52-53).
11. Note that van Musschenbroek’s notion of cause is abstract 
in the sense that it does not stipulate a modus operandi of 
the forces involved. Correspondingly, annotations in one 
of his copies of Institutiones physicæ he defined a cause 
as “whatever produces an effect [quicquid producit effec-
tum]” (LUL, BPL 240.56, f. 212r).
12. The words “per Infinitam potentiam” occur in the original 
text, but for some reason they were left out of the transla-
tion (van Musschenbroek, 1741, p. 5).
13. This manuscript contains van Musschenbroek’s Oratio de 
astronomia (1732).
14. For further background on Spinoza’s impact in the Dutch 
Republic, see Israel, 1995 and 2001 and van Bunge, 2001, 
chapter 5.
15. For a variety of reasons, van Musschenbroek had become 
sceptical of analogia, i.e. inductive generalization, at the 
latest by the early 1740s (Ducheyne, 2015).
16. The above passage was clearly inspired by the follow-
ing lines of Newton’s General Scholium: “We see only the 
shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their sounds, we 
touch only their external surfaces, we smell only their odors, 
and we taste their flavors. But there is no direct sense and 
there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know 
innermost substances; […].” (Newton 1999, p. 942).
17. On van Musschenbroek’s treatment of (essential) attri-
butes, which are immutable, and properties, which are ac-
cidental, see van Musschenbroek, 1748b, pp. 6-7.
18. Here van Musschenbroek, who denied that motion is es-
sential to matter (Ducheyne, 2014c, pp. 178-179), was en-
dorsing the “active Principles” which in Newton’s opinion 
underlie gravitational interaction (Newton, 1952, p. 401). 
See Ducheyne, 2014d for additional background.
19. In the General Scholium to the second edition of the 
Principia (1713), Newton famously pointed out that he 
had “not yet assigned a cause to gravity:” “I have not as 
NOTES
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yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for 
these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses.” 
(Newton, 1999, p. 943). Elsewhere I have argued that van 
Musschenbroek cannot be considered as a straightfor-
ward follower of Newton’s doctrines and that his method-
ological views were different from Newton’s (Ducheyne, 
2015). See Ducheyne, 2014a and 2014b for a mitigation of 
Newton’s influence on ’s Gravesande.
20. See, furthermore, Ducheyne, 2012, chapter 1 for addi-
tional background.
21. For van Musschenbroek’s views on the origin of physics, 
see van Musschenbroek, 1726, pp. 5-11.
22. During his period in Duisburg, van Musschenbroek deliv-
ered an extensive lecture series on the five senses (LUL, 
BPL 240.28, ff. 1r-164v).
23. Corresponding draft material and variants are to be 
found in LUL, BPL 240.9, f. 4r-v, where Wolff’s “Logica” 
(i.e. Wolff, 1728) is mentioned explicitly (f. 4r), LUL, BPL 
240.24, f. 1r and LUL, BPL 240.56, ff. 1r-29r. The earliest 
datable document in which van Musschenbroek en-
dorsed the above division is his lecture Consilia de diri-
genda studio philosophico which was read in 1730 (LUL, 
BPL 240.30, ff. 2v-3r). In later work, van Musschenbroek 
maintained this division. In what follows, I shall docu-
ment relevant additions which occur in Beginselen der 
natuurkunde, Institutiones physicæ, and Introductio ad 
philosophiam naturalem. In van Musschenbroek, 1726, 
p. 2, he distinguished only between physica, pneumatica, 
practica and logica. In any case, the influence of Wolff’s 
division was clearly noticeable in van Musschenbroek’s 
description of philosophy.
24. For, as van Musschenbroek argued, “power without sub-
stance cannot be conceived [potentia vero sine substantia 
concipi non potest]” (LUL, BPL 240.7, f. 11v).
25. In van Musschenbroek, 1756, xliii, van Musschenbroek 
warned against introducing metaphysics in physics.
26. On van Musschenbroek’s Institutiones logicæ, see Schuur-
man, 2004, pp. 156-164.
27. That van Musschenbroek focused on the establishment of 
regularities is consistent with his experimental and obser-
vational practice (de Pater, 2012 and Ducheyne, 2015).
28. Van Musschenbroek owned several works by Wolff 
([anon.], 1762, p. 82 [item n° 458]).
29. Van Musschenbroek was well versed in Descartes’ meta-
physics, for he composed a 259 folios long synthesis of 
the latter’s Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) 
(LUL, BPL 240.27). When criticizing Descartes’ stance on 
final causes, he drew attention to paragraph 28 of the first 
part of Principia Philosophiae (1644), which was entitled 
“Non causas finales rerum creatarum, sed efficientes esse 
examinandas.” (LUL, BPL 240.56, f. 19r; Adam and Tannery, 
1897-1913, vol. VIII, pp. 15-16).
30. Between 1738 and 1739 Beginselen der natuurkunde 
(1736) met with the fierce criticism of the Dutch Wolf-
flian Nicolaus Engelhard (1696-1765) (de Pater, 1990 
and de Clercq, 1997b, pp. 145-147. In LUL, BPL 240.56, 
f. 223r-v, Engelhard is presented as a dogmatic disciple 
of Leibniz and in van Musschenbroek’s annotated copy 
of Elementa physicae (1734) Engelhard’s metaphysical 
approach is contrasted with Newton’s non-hypothetical 
method in the Opticks (LUL, BPL 240.54, interleaved folio 
facing p. 6). When Engelhard ordered a series of instru-
ments from van Musschenbroek’s brother, Jan, the latter 
quite sarcastically inquired for which purpose the former 
could possibly set them to use (BML, a 541 [copy of a let-
ter of Jan van Musschenbroek to Nicolaus Engelhard on 
6 October 1739]).
31. I should note that I have found no direct evidence in his 
manuscripts that shows that Newton was directly on van 
Musschenbroek’s mind when discussing teleology.
32. In van Musschenbroek, 1736, vol. I, p. 3, van Musschen-
broek inserted the words “in creandis & moderandis re-
bus” after the word ‘Deus’.
33. Cf. LUL, BPL 240.35, f. 134r.
34. For Wolff’s views on teleology, see Wolfius, 1728, p. 38, 
pp. 45-46. In van Musschenbroek, 1748, p. 2, van Muss-
chenbroek’s did not make it explicit that the study of te-
leology is to be valued because it displays God’s wisdom 
and goodness. There he restricted himself to the follow-
ing words: “hæc pars non est expers utilitatis, cum augeat 
nostram cognitionem, attamen nunquam perfici poterit.”
35. Since van Musschenbroek’s discussion is more detailed in 
Introductio ad philosophiam naturalem than in Institutiones 
physicæ, I shall quote from the former. Corresponding man-
uscript material is to be found on LUL, BPL 240.56, f. 25r.
36. In the oration which he delivered on 8 February 1744 
when he became rector of Leiden University, van Muss-
chenbroek offered a cornucopia of design arguments 
mainly taken from the animal and plant kingdom which 
according to him testify of God’s providential plan (van 
Musschenbroek, 1744). For further details, see Roosen-
boom, 1970 and Bots, 1972, pp. 56-57. In his oration De 
astronomia præstantia et et utilate quam aliis scientiis as-
sert., which he delivered on 6 October 1732, he empha-
sized that astronomy provides a tool for understanding 
God’s immensity and infinity (LUL, BPL 240.7, f. 11r-v).
37. On the principle of sufficient reason, see Melamed, 2010; 
Gurr, 1959, chapter 2, and Lovejoy, 1964, chapter 5.
38. Wolff defined a ‘sufficient reason’ as that “from which it is 
understood why something is [unde intelligitur, cur aliquid 
sit]” (Wolff, 1736, p. 24).
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